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Introduction 
Agricultural economists use experimental auctions to gain insight into consumer behavior, the 
impact of information, and more (Lusk and Shogren 2007). Part of the appeal is that 
experimental auctions are theoretically demand revealing. However, several recent studies find 
that experimental auctions may not be demand revealing in practice. Factors affecting bids 
include posting prices across repeated rounds (Corrigan et al. 2011), participation fees (Loureiro 
et al. 2003), and endowing participants with products (Corrigan and Rousu 2006). 
A set of best-practices has emerged to minimize potential biases in experimental auction 
results. For example, most practitioners agree that auction experiments should include practice 
sessions. (Drichoutis et al. 2010) show that participants with extensive training bid more 
rationally than those without. (Rickertsen and Alfnes 2011), in a review of experimental 
auctions, present a list of recommendations for practitioners, including “make sure the 
participants understand the mechanism”. The authors suggest that one way to ensure 
understanding is to include practice rounds. 
However, practice rounds raise their own unanswered questions. Research suggests that 
bids can become “anchored” to seemingly unrelated price information (e.g., Ariely et al. 2003). 
If so, practice bids my inadvertently affect later “real” bids. Absent anchoring, practice bids 
could perhaps explain some variation in real bidding. For example, free-spending bidders may 
place higher value on all products, while more trusting bidders may have greater faith in the 
auction mechanism. Either group would bid higher in both practice and real rounds. 
Misunderstanding of the auction mechanism could also lead to correlation between practice and real bids. Participants who mistakenly believe it is their best interest to underbid might do so in 
both practice and real rounds.  
To our knowledge, no study has looked at the relationship between practice and real bids, 
let alone tried to determine what drives any possible correlation. We do this first, by examining 
results from two experimental auctions for goods with homegrown values and find a significant 
positive correlation between practice and real bids for unrelated products. We then use results 
from an experiment that uses an induced value practice auction prior to using a homegrown 
auction to help determine what causes this correlation. We begin by discussing the data from the 
homegrown auction experiments 
 
How do practice rounds influence bidding homegrown-value auctions? 
We used results from two auctions that the authors of this paper published in the past. We also 
looked for other datasets from other authors, both from our own experiments and by others. In 
other datasets we found where practice round bids were collected – the bids were never entered 
into the datasets. This is true both for our old datasets and others. We emailed one prominent 
experimental economist who works on agricultural economic issues and were told:  
I pulled up three old data sets associated with various published papers. Alas, it seems I did 
not enter the practice round data (normally with candy bars) for any of them. In all the 
studies I’ve done, the “practice” rounds have been non-hypothetical. 
This issue has been completely off the radar of experimental economists, which is odd 
given how much research has gone into showing how auction procedures can matter. We look at 
two different studies to examine how practice round bids correlate with real round bids.  
 Study 1: Practice bids on pens and pencils before bidding on fair trade food products 
This data set comes from Corrigan and Rousu (2008). We will only present a brief overview of 
the experimental design here, for a more complete look at the design see Corrigan and Rousu 
(2008), Rousu and Corrigan (2008a,b), or Colson, Corrigan, and Rousu (2010). Participants in 
this field experiment bid in hypothetical practice auctions on a box of pens and a box of pencils. 
In real auction rounds participants placed bids on a chocolate candy bar and a bunch of bananas. 
The demand revealing BDM mechanism was used.  
Figure 1 shows a clear positive relationship between the bids in the practice and real 
rounds. The regression results below (t-statistics in parentheses) show that a $0.10 increase in a 
participant’s average practice round bid is associated with a $0.05 increase in average real round 
bid. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Real Bid = 0.48 + 0.49 Practice Bid




Study 2: Practice bids on candy bars before real round bids on cigarettes 
This data set comes from Thrasher et al. (2011). Again, we only present a brief design here. 
Participants in this field experiment bid in hypothetical practice auctions on two candy bars. In 
real auction rounds participants bid on cigarettes with different types of labels. The demand 
revealing BDM mechanism was used.  
Figure 2 again shows a clear positive relationship between the bids in the practice and 
real rounds. The regression results below (t-statistics in parentheses) show that a $0.10 increase 
in a participant’s average practice round bid is associated with a $0.15 increase in average real 
round bid. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Real Bid = 2.23 + 1.47 Practice Bid




Potential explanations for why practice rounds affect real round bidding 
We find clear evidence that there is a positive relationship between bids in the practice round and 
bids in the real round. However, there are many potential reasons for why this relationship might 
exist. We now outline several different theories that could potentially explain why high bidding 
in the practice round may be correlated with high bidding in the real rounds.  
 
Free-Spending Effect 
One participant may be more likely to bid more for all products– i.e., he or she may be more 
free-spending. If this is the case, we would expect that participant to bid more for all products in 
an auction – both practice round bids and real round bids.  
 
Trust Effect 
Some participants in an auction setting may be more skeptical of the proceedings – thinking the 
experimental auction may be a scam or simply not trust the procedures in the auction. If this 
occurs, we would expect those who bid low because of lack of trust in the practice auctions to 
also bid low in the real auction rounds.  
 
Anchoring Effect 
There is widespread evidence that bids can be anchored (Corrigan and Rousu 2006, Nunes and 
Boatwright 2004). Because of this, if a participant bids higher in a practice round, she may 
subconsciously anchor her bid in the real round to the bid in the practice round.    
Misunderstanding Effect 
Most participants in field auctions have never before participated in a 2
nd price auction, nor have 
they used the BDM mechanism. Thus, following the state-of-the-art procedures recommending 
explanations and practice rounds may not be sufficient for participants to understand how the 
auction works.   
 
  Any of these four explanations could be driving the results, and the results from the 
homegrown auction alone will not let us determine which of these four explanations may be 
causing the correlation between practice bids and real round bids. To help gain insight into which 
of these explanations might be most likely, we designed and conducted an induced value auction. 
We now describe the auction.  
 
Induced Value Auctions: Design and Results 
Study 3: Practice bids on induced values before real round bids on coffee mugs 
In order to determine whether anchoring alone is driving the positive correlation between 
practice and real round bids observed in the previous sections, we report the results of a study 
where all participants submitted practice bids for a $1 induced value and then submitted real bids 
for a university-logo coffee mug. These data were collected at Iowa State University in the 
spring of 2002 and are described in Corrigan (2005). The experiment consisted of four 
experimental units—two WTP and two WTA—each with thirty participants, for a total of 120 
participants.  Each experimental treatment had six steps. (1) Subjects were read an introduction to the 
experiment and an explanation of the random nth-price auction mechanism. (2) Subjects 
submitted bids in a hypothetical auction for a dollar bill. (3) The monitor explained that the next 
two auction rounds would be for a university-logo coffee mug and that only one of the two 
rounds would be binding.
1 (4) Subjects inspected the mug and, depending on the treatment, 
submitted bids indicating their WTP or WTA. Participants then completed and submitted a 
socioeconomic survey. (5) Subjects submitted a second bid indicating either their WTP or WTA. 
(6) The monitor determined and announced the binding round and random nth price, and any 
transactions agreed to were carried out.  
During the first step, subjects read along as the monitor read the experiment’s instructions 
aloud. These instructions contained both a brief introduction to the experiment, as well as a 
detailed description of the workings of the random nth-price auction. The monitor also went over 
an example auction on the blackboard and administered a short quiz to test subjects’ 
understanding of the auction mechanism. 
The second step was a non-binding practice auction for a dollar bill. Depending on 
whether subjects in a given round had been assigned the role of buyers or sellers, they bid to buy 
or sell a dollar bill. Bids were collected and ranked on the blackboard. The monitor randomly 
selected and announced the nth price, then informed that, had this been a real round, anyone who 
submitted a bid above (below) the cut-off price would buy (sell) a dollar bill. 
During step three, the monitor informed subjects that the following two auction rounds 
would be for a university-logo coffee mugs, but that only one of the two rounds would be 
                                                             
1 The results from the second potentially binding auction round were used as part of a different study focusing on 
how auction values are affected by information about the extent of the resale market and are not reported here. binding, and that the binding round would be determined by a coin flip after both rounds had 
been completed. This was done to eliminate demand-curve effects. 
In step four, subjects were given the chance to inspect the mugs being auctioned off and 
to submit a bid indicating their maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness to accept 
compensation in exchange for) for such a mug. After submitting their bids, subjects completed a 
survey designed to collect data on their age, gender, and income. Upon completion, the monitor 
collected these surveys. 
During step five, subjects submitted a second bid indicating their maximum willingness 
to pay (minimum willingness to accept compensation in exchange) for the mug.  
In step six, the binding mug round was determined by flipping a coin. After announcing 
the result of the coin flip, the bids from that round were ranked on the blackboard. The cut-off 
bid was determined at random and was announced along with the cut-off price. Subjects were 
informed that if they had submitted a bid above (below) this cut-off price, they would purchase 
(sell) a mug at that price. Subjects were then paid $15 for their participation, and any transactions 
agreed to were carried out. 
In order to solicit subjects’ valuations, we used a variation of the random nth-price 
auction mechanism developed by Shogren et al. (2001). Specifically, the market price is chosen 
at random from the bids submitted by market participants. In the buyer case, one of the bids 
submitted by potential buyers is chosen at random as the cut-off price. Anyone who submitted a 
bid higher than that price buys the good at the cut-off price. Anyone who submitted a bid at or 
below the cut-off price buys nothing. Thus, by separating what subjects bid from what they pay 
if they win the auction, the random nth-price auction mechanism preserves the demand-revealing 
properties of the Vickrey auction. Shogren et al. (2001) show that the random nth-price auction does in fact outperform the Vickrey auction mechanism when it comes to motivating off-margin 
bidders to bid their true valuation in an auction for induced value tokens.
2 
Figure 3 shows the positive correlation between the practice bid for a dollar bill and the 
real bid for a coffee mug from the combined treatments. The following regression analysis 
confirms that there is indeed a positive and statistically significant relationship between practice 
bids and real bids. Note that t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Real Bid = 0.92 + 2.78 Practice Bid
                 (0.92)  (2.75)

 
These results suggest that a 10¢ increase in the practice bid results in roughly a 28¢ increase in 
the real bid that follows.
3 Again, because the “induced value” in the practice round did not vary 
across participants, anchoring cannot explain this correlation. The correlation must instead be the 
result of trust, free spending, or misunderstanding. Unfortunately, this data set does not allow us 
to distinguish which of these three possible explanations is primarily responsible for the 
correlation between practice bids and real bids. 
 
Conclusion 
The use of practice auction rounds to ensure participant understanding is now standard in 
experimental auctions. The effect of practice round bids, however, has been ignored. In this 
paper we compare practice round and real round bids from three auction experiments and find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship in each case. We then discuss four potential 
                                                             
2 It can be argued that the random nth-price auction mechanism’s endogenous determination of market price is 
actually a weakness. For example, an altruistic potential buyer might submit a zero bid in the hope that her bid 
would be chosen as the cut-off price, thus yielding the highest possible surplus for her fellow bidders. 
3 Focusing on WTP or WTA in isolation yields results that are qualitatively similar though not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. We also excluded data for an individual who submitted a $4 bid for the dollar bill 
in the practice round. Including this individual’s bids does not qualitatively change our results but does reduce their 
statistical significance. reasons for this relationship: the free spending effect, the trust effect, the misunderstanding 
effect, and the anchoring effect. 
While we cannot determine which of these four effects is the primary determinant of the 
correlation between practice and real bids, the results from our induced value auction show that 
the correlation is not simply the results of anchoring. Future research involving more induced 
value experiments is needed to help determine which of these effects is causing the positive 
correlation between practice round bids and real round bids. 
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   Figure 1: Relationship between practice and real bids in the fair trade study 
 
   





























Average of practice bidsFigure 2: Relationship between practice and real bids in the cigarette labeling study 
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